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Abstract
How do cultural differences in preferences affect economic development? This study
develops a simple growth model that features two stages of development. In the first
stage, economic growth is driven by human capital accumulation. In the second stage,
economic growth is driven by innovation. The economy does not necessarily experience
the transition from the first stage to the second stage. If this endogenous transition does
not occur, the economy converges to a steady-state level of output. The economy remains
in this middle-income trap if leisure preference is too strong or parental preference for
education is either too weak or too strong.
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Culture is a set of values that influence people’s preferences. To explore how cultural differences
in preferences affect economic development, we develop a simple growth model that features
two stages of development. In the first stage, economic growth is driven by human capital
accumulation. In the second stage, economic growth is driven by innovation. The transition
from the first stage to the second stage is endogenous. If this transition occurs, the economy
converges to a balanced growth path with long-run growth driven by innovation. If the transition
does not occur, the economy converges to a steady state with a stationary level of output. The
economy remains in this middle-income trap if (1) leisure preference is too strong, (2) research
productivity or education productivity is too low, or (3) parental preference for education is
either too weak or too strong. Therefore, a society that values hard work and places a reasonable
emphasis on education would achieve long-run growth.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. First, a strong preference for
leisure causes people to allocate too much time to leisure and too little time to production and
education. As a result, the market size never becomes large enough for innovation to occur.
Second, low education productivity gives rise to a low level of human capital, which reduces
capacity for innovation. Third, low research productivity reduces incentives for innovation.
Finally, a weak preference for education gives rise to a low level of human capital whereas a
strong preference for education gives rise to overinvestment in human capital that crowds out
resources for innovation.
This study relates to the literature on growth and innovation. The seminal study by Romer
(1990) develops the R&D-based growth model with the development of new products.1 While
Romer (1990) and other early studies do not consider human capital accumulation in the R&D-
based growth model, subsequent studies introduce human capital accumulation and explore its
implications on innovation; see for example, Eicher (1996), Zeng (1997, 2003), Strulik (2005,
2007), Chu et al. (2013, 2016), Hashimoto and Tabata (2016) and Prettner and Strulik (2016).
This study differs from them by considering human capital accumulation and innovation as the
main engines of growth at different stages of development.
A number of studies also explore different stages of development in the R&D-based growth
model; see for example, Zilibotti (1995), Peretto (1999), Funke and Strulik (2000), Irmen (2005)
and Kuwahara (2007, 2013, 2019). These studies consider the case in which an economy features
human/physical capital accumulation in an early stage of development and then innovation in
a later stage. Some of them also explore when this transition occurs and when the economy
remains in the middle-income trap.2 This study complements these interesting studies by ex-
ploring how preferences for leisure and education affect the transition from capital accumulation
to innovation.
Finally, this study also relates to the literature on preference formation and economic growth.
Early studies by Galor and Moav (2002) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) develop interesting
growth models with evolution in preferences, in which the proportion of individuals with differ-
ent preferences for child quality in Galor and Moav (2002) and different preferences for patience
and leisure in Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) evolves overtime and affects economic development.
1See also Aghion and Howitt (1992) who develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model.
2See Agenor (2017) for an excellent survey of studies on middle-income traps.
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A recent empirical study by Galor and Ozak (2016) provides evidence on the pre-industrial
agricultural origins of differences in time preferences and their effects on education and tech-
nology in the modern era. Ashraf and Galor (2018) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) provide
surveys of this literature. This study builds on this literature by exploring how differences in
preferences affect an economy across stages of development with different growth engines and
its likelihood of staying in a middle-income trap.
2 The model
We modify the Romer model to allow for a simple structure of overlapping generations and
human capital accumulation.3 Individuals live for three periods. In her young age, an individual
receives education. In her working age, the individual allocates her time between leisure, work
and education of the next generation. In her old age, the individual consumes her saving.
2.1 Individuals
A unit continuum of individuals is born in each generation. The utility of an individual who
works at time t is given by
U t = u(lt, Ct+1, Ht+1) = η ln lt + lnCt+1 + γ lnHt+1, (1)
where lt denotes the amount of time allocated to leisure at time t and η ≥ 0 is the leisure
preference parameter. Ct+1 is consumption at time t + 1. For simplicity, the individual only
consumes in the old age.4 Ht+1 denotes human capital the individual passes onto her child, and
γ > 0 is the education preference parameter. The individual allocates et units of time to her
child’s education. The accumulation of human capital is determined as follows:5
Ht+1 = φet + (1− δ)Ht, (2)
where the parameter φ > 0 determines education productivity and the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1)
determines the depreciation of human capital that a generation passes onto the next. For
simplicity, education is the only form of bequest.6
The individual allocates 1− lt − et units of time to work and earns wt(1− lt − et)Ht as real
wage income. The individual devotes her entire wage income to saving at time t and consumes
the return at time t+ 1:
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)wt(1− lt − et)Ht, (3)
where rt+1 is the real interest rate. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), the individual maximizes
max
et, lt
U t = η ln lt + ln[(1 + rt+1)wt(1− lt − et)Ht] + γ ln[φet + (1− δ)Ht],
3The formulation is based on Chu et al. (2016), who however focus on the second stage of development and
do not consider the first stage.
4All our results hold if individuals also consume in the working age; see Appendix C.
5See Chu et al. (2016) for an extension that allows for public investment in education.
6See Chu et al. (2016) for an extension that allows for multiple channels of bequest.
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taking {rt+1, wt, Ht} as given. The utility-maximizing levels of leisure lt and education et are
lt = η
φ+ (1− δ)Ht
φ(1 + η + γ)
, (4)
et =
φγ − (1 + η)(1− δ)Ht
φ (1 + η + γ)
. (5)
Substituting (5) into (2) yields the following law of motion for human capital:
Ht+1 =
γ
1 + η + γ
[φ+ (1− δ)Ht] . (6)




1 + η + δγ
. (7)
2.2 Final good
This sector is characterized by perfect competition. Firms produce final good Yt (numeraire)







HY,t denotes human-capital-embodied production labor, and the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) deter-
mines labor intensity 1− α in production. There is a continuum of differentiated intermediate
goods indexed by i ∈ [0, Nt], and Xt(i) denotes intermediate good i. Maximizing profit, we
derive the conditional demand functions for HY,t and Xt(i) as
wt = (1− α)Yt/HY,t, (9)
pt(i) = α [HY,t/Xt(i)]
1−α . (10)
2.3 Intermediate goods
This sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. A monopolistic firm produces Xt(i)
using a linear production function that transforms one unit of Yt into one unit of Xt(i). The
profit function is
πt(i) = pt(i)Xt(i)−Xt(i), (11)
where the cost of producing one unit of Xt(i) is one (recall that final good is the numeraire).





which is above the marginal cost of production. Substituting (12) into (10) shows that Xt(i) =











This sector is characterized by perfect competition. Let vt denote the value of a newly invented
intermediate good at the end of time t, which is given by the present value of future profits








(1 + rτ )
]
. (14)
R&D entrepreneurs devote HR,t units of human-capital-embodied labor to the invention of new
products. The innovation process is specified as
∆Nt = θNtHR,t, (15)
where ∆Nt ≡ Nt+1 − Nt. The parameter θ > 0 determines R&D productivity θNt, where Nt
captures intertemporal knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1990). If the following holds:
∆Ntvt = wtHR,t ⇔ θNtvt = wt, (16)
then R&D HR,t would be positive at time t. If θNtvt < wt, then R&D does not take place at
time t (i.e., HR,t = 0).
Lemma 1 R&D HR,t is positive at time t if and only if the following inequality holds:
(1− lt − et)Ht =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2





Proof. See Appendix A.
2.5 Aggregation








which is the aggregate production function of Yt. The resource constraint on final good is
Ct = Yt −NtXt = (1− α
2)Yt, (19)
which uses NtXt = α
2Yt. Finally, the resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor is




3 Stages of economic development
In this section, we explore the two stages of economic development. In the first stage, the
economy features only human capital accumulation. In the second stage, the economy features
both human capital accumulation and innovation. The simplicity of the model allows us to
derive a closed-form solution for the transition dynamics.
3.1 Stage 1: Human capital accumulation only
The initial level of human capital is H0. We assume the following inequality holds at time 0:
(1− l0 − e0)H0 =
φH0 + (1− δ)(H0)
2





Then, Lemma 1 implies that HR,0 = 0 and
HY,0 = (1− l0 − e0)H0 =
φH0 + (1− δ)(H0)
2
φ(1 + η + γ)
, (22)
where the second equality uses (4) and (5). At this stage of development, the economy features
only human capital accumulation. Human capital Ht accumulates according to the autonomous
dynamics in (6). So long as the following inequality holds at time t:
(1− lt − et)Ht =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2





we continue to have HR,t = 0 and
HY,t = (1− lt − et)Ht =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2
φ(1 + η + γ)
. (24)
Substituting (24) into (18) yields the level of output as
Yt = α
2α/(1−α)N0
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2
φ(1 + η + γ)
, (25)
where N0 remains at the initial level and output Yt increases as human capital Ht accumulates.
Human capital Ht eventually converges to H
∗ in (7). Substituting (7) into (23) yields
(1− l∗ − e∗)H∗ =
φγ





If the inequality in (26) holds, then the economy would never experience innovation. The
economy remains indefinitely in this middle-income trap in the case of strong leisure preference
η, low research productivity θ, low education productivity φ, or education preference γ being
too weak or too strong. Intuitively, strong leisure preference causes people to allocate too
much time to leisure and too little time to education, whereas low education productivity and
low research productivity reduce incentives for human capital accumulation and innovation. A
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weak preference for education causes a low level of human capital whereas a strong preference
for education leads to overinvestment in human capital that crowds out the amount of human-
capital-embodied labor (1− l∗ − e∗)H∗ for innovation.
In the middle-income trap, the steady-state level of output is given by
Y ∗ = α2α/(1−α)N0
φγ
(1 + η + δγ)2
, (27)
which is decreasing in leisure preference η, increasing in education productivity φ, and an
inverted-U function in education preference γ. Intuitively, strong leisure preference causes
people to allocate too much time to leisure and too little time to production, whereas low
education productivity reduces incentives for human capital accumulation. Finally, as before, a
weak preference for education leads to a low level of human capital whereas a strong preference
for education leads to overinvestment in human capital that crowds out the amount of human-
capital-embodied labor (1− l∗ − e∗)H∗ for production.
Proposition 1 If (1) leisure preference η is sufficiently strong, (2) research productivity θ or
education productivity φ is sufficiently low, or (3) education preference γ is sufficiently weak or
sufficiently strong, the economy would remain in the middle-income trap, in which steady-state
output Y ∗ is decreasing in leisure preference η, increasing in education productivity φ, and an
inverted-U function in education preference γ.
Proof. Use (26) and (27).
3.2 Stage 2: Innovation and human capital accumulation
Lemma 1 implies that if the following inequality holds:
(1− l∗ − e∗)H∗ =
φγ





then human capital Ht eventually becomes sufficiently large to trigger the activation of inno-
vation. This threshold H̃ is given by
φH̃ + (1− δ)(H̃)2











Therefore, for Ht > H̃, the R&D condition in (16) holds and R&D HR,t is positive.
Substituting (18) into (9) yields the equilibrium wage rate as
wt = (1− α)α
2α/(1−α)Nt. (30)






The structure of overlapping generations implies that the value of assets at the end of time t
must equal the amount of saving at time t given by wage income at time t:
Nt+1vt = wt(1− lt − et)Ht = wt(HY,t +HR,t), (32)
where the second equality uses (20). Substituting (30) and (31) into (32) yields
Nt+1 = θNt(HY,t +HR,t). (33)





for all t. Substituting (4), (5) and (34) into (20) yields the equilibrium level of HR,t as
HR,t = (1− lt − et)Ht −HY,t =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2











φ(1 + η + γ)
[




For a given Ht, gt is increasing in research productivity θ but decreasing in leisure preference
η, education productivity φ and education preference γ. Intuitively, high research productivity
raises incentives for innovation whereas high education productivity or strong education pref-
erence leads to a reallocation of resources from innovation to education. Finally, strong leisure
preference causes people to allocate too much time to leisure and too little time to innovation.
The growth rate gt also determines output growth. To see this, we substitute (34) into (18)





which grows at the same rate as Nt. Therefore, although human capital continues to accumulate
until reaching the steady state, human capital accumulation affects the growth rate of output
only indirectly via innovation. As human capital Ht increases according to (6), the equilibrium
growth rate gt in (36) also increases.
As human capital converges to its steady-state level H∗ in (7), the equilibrium growth rate
also converges to its steady state given by
g∗ =
θφγ
(1 + η + δγ)2
− 1, (38)
which is decreasing in leisure preference η, increasing in research productivity θ and education
productivity φ, and an inverted-U function in education preference γ.7 Intuitively, strong
leisure preference causes people to allocate too much time to leisure and too little time to
innovation and education, whereas low education productivity reduces incentives for human
capital accumulation and low research productivity reduces incentives for innovation. Finally,
a weak preference for education leads to a low level of human capital whereas a strong preference
for education leads to overinvestment in human capital that crowds out resources for innovation.
7This inverted-U effect of education preference on steady-state growth was also shown in Chu et al. (2016).
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Proposition 2 In the second stage of development, innovation is activated. For a given level
of human capital Ht, the equilibrium growth rate gt is increasing in research productivity θ but
decreasing in leisure preference η, education productivity φ and education preference γ. As
human capital Ht accumulates, the equilibrium growth rate gt increases. As human capital Ht
converges to the steady state, the equilibrium growth rate gt also converges to the steady-state
growth rate g∗, which is decreasing in leisure preference η, increasing in research productivity θ
and education productivity φ, and an inverted-U function in education preference γ.
Proof. Use (36) and (38).
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a simple growth model that features two stages of development
to explore the effects of preferences for leisure and education on the transition from human
capital accumulation to innovation. We find that under a strong preference for leisure or a
parental preference for education that is either too weak or too strong, the economy would
remain in a middle-income trap with a steady-state level of output. Only when a society values
hard work and places a reasonable emphasis on education, the economy would achieve economic
growth in the long run.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. If (17) holds, then (35) shows that HR,t > 0. Now, let’s consider the
case in which
(1− lt − et)Ht =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2





Recall that the value of assets at the end of time t must equal the amount of saving at time t
given by wage income at time t such that
Nt+1vt = wt(1− lt − et)Ht. (A2)
Substituting (A2) into (A1) yields
wt > θNt+1vt ≥ θNtvt, (A3)
where the second inequality uses Nt+1 ≥ Nt. Equation (A3) implies that ∆Ntvt = wtHR,t in
(16) cannot hold unless HR,t = 0.
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Appendix B: Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations {Xt(i), Yt, Ct, HY,t, HR,t, Ht, et, lt} and prices
{pt(i), wt, rt, vt} that satisfy the following conditions:
• individuals choose {et, lt} to maximize utility taking {rt+1, wt, Ht} as given;
• competitive firms produce Yt to maximize profit taking {pt(i), wt} as given;
• a monopolistic firm produces Xt(i) and chooses pt(i) to maximize profit;
• competitive entrepreneurs perform R&D to maximize profit taking {wt, vt} as given;
• the market for final good clears such that Yt = NtXt + Ct;
• the market for human-capital-embodied labor clears such thatHY,t+HR,t = (1−lt−et)Ht;
• the amount of saving equals the value of assets such that wt(1− lt − et)Ht = Nt+1vt.
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Appendix C: Consumption
Suppose we modify (1) to allow for consumption also in the working age. Then, we have




t+1, Ht+1) = η ln lt + (1− β) lnC
t
t + β lnC
t
t+1 + γ lnHt+1, (C1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) determines the relative importance of Ctt and C
t
t+1, which denote consumption
at time t and t+ 1 of an individual who works at time t. Let st denote the saving rate. Then,
Ctt = (1− st)wt(1− lt − et)Ht, (C2)
Ctt+1 = (1 + rt+1)stwt(1− lt − et)Ht. (C3)
Substituting (2), (C2) and (C3) into (C1) and maximizing utility yield st = β and also (4)-(6)
as before. The rest of the model is the same as before.
The value of assets at the end of time t must equal the amount of saving at time t:
Nt+1vt = stwt(1− lt − et)Ht = stwt(HY,t +HR,t), (C4)
which differs from (32) due to st = β < 1. Substituting (30) and (31) into (C4) yields
Nt+1 = βθNt(HY,t +HR,t). (C5)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (20) yields
HY,t +HR,t = (1− lt − et)Ht =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2
φ(1 + η + γ)
. (C6)
Combining (15), (C5) and (C6) yields
HR,t = β
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2





where I have assumed HR,t > 0, which holds if and only if
β
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2





In the first stage of development, we have HR,t = 0 and
HY,t = (1− lt − et)Ht =
φHt + (1− δ)(Ht)
2
φ(1 + η + γ)
. (C9)
The economy is in this stage whenever Ht < H̃, where H̃ is given by
β
φH̃ + (1− δ)(H̃)2











The economy remains in this middle-income trap indefinitely if
β(1− l∗ − e∗)H∗ =
βφγ





which holds if β is sufficiently small (i.e., individuals are impatient).






φ(1 + η + γ)
[




which is increasing in β and determined by the dynamics of Ht in (6) as before. As Ht converges
to its steady state H∗ in (7), the growth rate gt also converges to its steady state given by
g∗ =
βθφγ
(1 + η + δγ)2
− 1, (C13)
which shows that g∗ is increasing in β and other comparative statics are the same as before.
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